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By Amelia H. Boss,* Harold R. Weinberg,** and William J. Woodward,
Jr.***
The Subcommittee on Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code ("Subcommit-
tee') continues its work in a number of important areas at the cutting edge of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "Code"). As a result of the report of
the Computer Services Task Force, Software Licensing Contracts: Proposal for
Study,' the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") appointed a study committee to consider whether to pursue the
drafting of a computer software contracting statute. Professor Raymond Nim-
mer, the author of the Computer Services Task Force Report, served as
Reporter to the study committee, which has recommended that NCCUSL
undertake to draft a software contracting statute. The Subcommittee is actively
monitoring and participating in this work of NCCUSL.
In addition to the Subcommittee's continuing work on intellectual property
financing and services contracts,2 it has formed another task force to examine
examples of conflict between the U.C.C. and other state and federal enactments
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in the commercial law area? This task force will monitor proposed legislation
and the attempts made to coordinate this legislation with existing or proposed
U.C.C. provisions.
The work of the Electronic Messaging Task Force4 has continued at full
speed and has resulted in the Subcommittee's final adoption of an Electronic
Messaging Report. The Subcommittee's work in the electronic messaging and
electronic data interchange areas is more fully developed in the following
foreword to the Subcommittee's contribution to the 1989 Uniform Commercial
Code Annual Survey. Following the foreword is an update of current cases
governing the law of computer contracting.
FOREWORD: COPING WITH ADVANCES IN
TECHNOLOGY; SHOULD THE LAW BE ACTIVE OR
REACTIVE?
The Subcommittee on Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code was created to
examine legal transactions and legal issues at the edges or periphery of the
Code. If one begins to think about the concepts of "scope" or "periphery," a
number of synonyms come to mind, such as border, circumference, or "the
extent of one's perception, understanding, knowledge or vision."5 In many ways,
these phrases describe the Subcommittee's activities.
The Subcommittee has become intensively involved in the area of electronic
messaging services and electronic data interchange. The Uniform Commercial
Code was originally drafted as an attempt to treat, in a comprehensive and
coherent manner, commercial transactions as they were being carried on be-
tween business (and non-business) entities. But times have changed since 1940,
and with the change has come a veritable revolution in the way businesses do
business. Two hundred years ago, the majority of business transactions were
carried out on a face-to-face basis. With the advent and growth of the postal
system, individuals began transacting business by mail through written corre-
spondence. Later still, telephone and telegraph augmented the manner in which
business was conducted. When the Code was drafted, these modes of communi-
cation had been around for some time and the Code rules were drafted with
them in mind.
Since the 1940s, the technology revolution has enabled people to communicate
electronically. Sitting at a computer terminal connected to a modem and a
telephone wire, it is possible to send a message anywhere in the country (or
throughout the world)-to another computer, to a telecopy or telefax machine,
even to a telephone. Paper is being replaced by electronic signals as a mode of
communication. This revolution calls into question some of the fundamental
rules upon which our contracts and the U.C.C. were built. On a broader scale,
electronic communication raises issues that include the rights and responsibili-
3. That project is being headed by Professor William J. Woodward, Jr.
4. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1520-21.
5. Roget's 11 The New Thesaurus 815 (1980).
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ties of providers and users of electronic mail systems, apportionment of respon-
sibility in the event of error, and authentication and privacy issues.
These developments challenge the legal community. Should the legal commu-
nity sit passively by, letting business struggle with the legal uncertainties of
these modes of communication, stepping in only to attempt to fashion airtight
agreements (where called upon to do so) or, more likely, to litigate controversies
when they arise? Or should the legal community become an active participant
in these developments, helping to channel and direct activity in the best interests
of all concerned? Indeed, these developments challenge the "extent of [our]
perception, understanding, knowledge, or vision."
The Subcommittee on Scope of the U.C.C. has accepted the challenge. In the
fall of 1988, the Subcommittee adopted its final report on Electronic Messag-
ing,6 produced by the Electronic Messaging Services Task Force. That report
dealt with one small but crucial part of the legal quagmire surrounding
electronic messaging.
What is electronic messaging, and why should commercial lawyers be con-
cerned with a development that appears to be within the province of intellectual
property?
Assume a buyer wishes to place a purchase order with a particular vendor. In
the past buyers routinely dispatched written purchase orders in such situations,
but today buyers may choose a quicker way, placing an order electronically and
routing it through a communications network like ABA/Net to a "mailbox" of
the vendor. That "mailbox" is in essence a storage area where electronic signals
are kept under the "name" of the vendor. The message is stored there and held
until the vendor checks its mailbox and reads its messages. Some systems
automatically notify the vendor when it receives mail, thus facilitating quick
access to the contents.
Under a variation of electronic messaging, the system will go even further:
The message (the purchase order), rather than being stored in a mailbox until it
is read, goes directly to the vendor's own computer. Indeed, the system may be
structured so that no human ever directly generates or reads the electronic
documents because the entire transaction is accomplished electronically. For
example, a computer may monitor the buyer's inventory. When the inventory
level falls to a specified level, a purchase order is automatically generated and
sent to the vendor. Upon receipt by the vendor's system, the vendor's computer
may generate the necessary acknowledgements, send the necessary manufacture
or shipment orders, and electronically bill the buyer.
The use of electronic messaging, even in a sales context, is not limited to the
buyer and the seller. Where a sales document requires a letter of credit to be
issued or goods to be shipped under a bill of lading, those documents also may
be electronically generated. Thus, the sales transaction, from the issuance of the
6. That report, Electronic Messaging Report, is available as Product No. 507-0210 through the
Order Fulfillment Department of the American Bar Association, 750 N. Lake Shore Drive,
Chicago, IL 60611.
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original purchase order, through shipment of the goods, to the ultimate pay-
ment, may be entirely electronic rather than paper-based.7
Such "paperless" transactions raise significant legal questions involving the
rights of the parties to the transaction, the rights of third party transferees, and
the rights and responsibilities of the electronic messaging system providing the
services. These are legal issues which exist whether we choose to deal with them
or not.
By becoming involved at an early stage, the Subcommittee on Scope of the
U.C.C. hopes to channel and focus the issues-and perhaps even venture a
solution or two. In 1986, the Subcommittee formed a Task Force on Electronic
Messaging Services to consider the impact of electronic mail and electronic data
interchange on the formation and enforcement of contracts and related issues. In
the task force's final report on electronic messaging, the Subcommittee focused
on many of the contracting issues, including the timing of contract formation,
the impact of the statute of frauds, the battle of the forms in electronic
interchanges, and conflict of law problems. The report urges evaluation of the
present provisions of U.C.C. article 2 on sales and full consideration of the
impact of electronic messaging systems and electronic data interchange on
present contract formation provisions of the Code. A present Article 2 Study
Committee,' appointed under the auspices of the Permanent Editorial Board of
the U.C.C., is currently studying whether to recommend amendments to article
2; undoubtedly, one major area of consideration will be electronic messaging
issues.
In addition, the task force has undertaken a study of electronic messaging
systems, electronic data interchange, and value-added network customer agree-
ments. It is now working on a model pre-authorization agreement to be used
between trading partners. The task force is continuing its study of the liabilities
and responsibilities of both customers and providers of electronic messaging
services.
The implications of electronic messaging range beyond the simple contracting
sphere. Recognizing the wide range of issues raised by technological develop-
ments in communication, the international as well as domestic forums in which
the issues should be discussed, and the need for coordination between legal,
technological and business groups, the Subcommittee formed a Technology
Coordinating Group in the fall of 1988.' This group is currently forging
coalitions with other groups in the field to examine the impact of electronic
7. The "electronically-based" sales transaction is not limited to the strictly commercial or
business context. With the growth of home computers and the proliferation of various on-line
services, consumers can purchase goods and other services from the privacy of their homes via
computer.
8. The Article 2 Study Committee is chaired by Professor Richard E. Speidel of Northwestern
University School of Law. Its members are Glenn Arendsen; Amelia H. Boss; Professor Steven L.
Harris; Professor Frederick H. Miller; Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr.; John E. Murray, Jr.;
Robert W. Weeks; and Professor James J. White.
9. The Technology Coordinating Group is chaired by Professor Patricia Brumfield Fry of the
University of North Dakota Law School.
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messaging in such areas as letters of credit, bills of lading, and international
communications. The challenge is a monumental one.
Through its Technology Coordinating Group and Electronic Messaging
Task Force, the Subcommittee is attempting to have the law join forces with
business and technology in order to confront the future and master it.
SURVEY: COMPUTER CONTRACTING CASES
The Subcommittee considers areas on the periphery of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Therefore, this survey is not limited to a discussion of cases directly
applying the Code to computer contracts"5 but generally discusses the underly-
ing legal problems and solutions in the computer area. The discussion is not
intended as an exhaustive review of computer law or the past year's develop-
ments. It highlights some of the more important recent developments and
analyzes them in a broader conceptual framework.
APPLICABLE LAW
U.C.C. Article 2 and Computer Contracts
Article 2 applies to "transactions in goods."" This scope provision is a
persistent source of computer contract case law." The term "transaction"
clearly includes "sales,""3 but issues arise as to whether it encompasses a lease or
a license.14 The limitation to "transactions in goods"' 5 raises questions such as
whether article 2 applies to mixed transactions with both service and goods
characteristics (e.g., a contract for the sale, installation, customizing, and main-
tenance of a computer). The question whether software is a good, a service, or
an intangible also may confront counsel.
10. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1521-22.
11. U.C.C. §2-102.
12. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1526-31. Sometimes courts apply the Uniform
Commercial Code to computer-related agreements with little or no analysis of the scope issue. See
Harper Tax Servs. v. Quick Tax Ltd., 686 F. Supp. 109, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 408
(D. Md. 1988) (software license); Meeting Makers, Inc. v. American Airlines, 513 So. 2d 700, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (lease of a modem and purchase
of a computer "system"). See also Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1337 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (customized software may be treated as a "thing" under Louisiana laws concerning redhibi-
tion).
13. U.C.C. § 2-101. Article 2 is the "sales" article; U.C.C. § 2-106(1) provides that "[a] 'sale'
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."
14. See, e.g., Schroders, Inc. v. Hogan Sys., 137 Misc. 2d 738, 522 N.Y.S.2d 404, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (applying article 2 to a software license). With the
final adoption of the 1987 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, containing a new article
2A on leasing transactions, much of the litigation on the application of article 2 to leases should be
eliminated.
15. U.C.C. § 2-102. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) provides in part: " 'Goods' means all things (including
specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than ... things in action."
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Word Management Corp. v. AT&T Information Systems 6 involved an
allegedly mixed sale and service transaction and illustrates some of the stakes
that may depend on whether article 2 applies. AT&T, which sells and services
communications equipment, contracted with Word, a computer typesetter, for
the sale of equipment that would provide Word with telephone communications
and information transfers between computers. The equipment did not function
as required, and Word alleged negligence on the part of AT&T in failing to
make it operational. The court stated that it had to decide whether the
transaction was a sale of goods within article 2 because, if it were, Word would
be limited to contract remedies and could not maintain tort causes of action.17 If
the transaction were predominantly service-oriented, on the other hand, then the
claims would fall outside the Code and Word would have no cause of action for
breach of warranty but would only have actions sounding in tort (unless,
perhaps, there was breach of an express warranty). The court determined that
the contract was for a sale of goods, not services."8 There was nothing to indicate
that AT&T was to perform any services other than installing the equipment
and making it operational. While it was obvious that some services were
involved, they were insufficient to make the contract one for services. 9
Sometimes a case raises multiple and overlapping article 2 scope issues. A
recent example, Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications
Inc.,2" arose out of an alleged breach of an agreement for the licensing,
installation, and servicing of a computer software package. Subsequently, the
parties entered into two contracts for additional software and related hardware.
The threshold legal issue was whether the "software computer package or
system" or "software equipment," as it was referred to by the court, involved a
transaction in goods.2 The court reasoned that, regardless of the specific form or
use of the software, it generally is considered to be a tangible and movable item,
not merely an intangible idea or thought. Therefore, the software qualified as
goods. This was so even though the ideas and concepts of the specially designed
software system remained the vendor's intellectual and copyrightable property
under the agreement.22
The vendor also contended that the transaction was not a "sale" within
U.C.C. section 2-106 because no title passed from the vendor to the vendee."
The court disagreed, noting that other opinions liberally construe the meaning
16. 525 N.Y.S.2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
17. Word had stated claims for both breach of warranty and negligence. The court raised the
issue of article 2 applicability noting that if article 2 applied, then Word had no cause of action in
negligence. The court raised the issue because Word alleged that the product did not perform as
promised and sought recovery for economic loss but not personal injury or property damages. Id. at
435-36.
18. Id. at 434.
19. Id. at 436.
20. 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 636 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
21. Id. at 343, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 638.
22. Id. at 344, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 639.
23. Id. at 345, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 640. See supra note 13.
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of "transaction" and analyze the underlying agreement to determine whether it
sufficiently resembles a sale. The court observed that other courts apply article 2
to leases of chattels, even though the lessor retains title to the goods, where the
rental payments under the lease are as large as the sales price of the same item.
Such a transaction is sufficiently analogous to a sale to be covered by the U.C.C.
and the Communications court adopted this mode of analysis. However, because
the economic effect of the agreement was unclear from the agreement itself and
the court lacked information as to the actual value of the software, the issues
could not be resolved without a trial.
24
Word and Communications are examples of cases where courts have applied
U.C.C. article 2 to computer contracts after giving deliberate consideration to
the scope issue. Other times the Code has not been applied or has been
supplemented by extra-Code principles of law. 5 For example, one recent
opinion relied on real property law to determine the rights of the assignee of a
computer lessor upon default by the lessee. 26 The special remedies and relief
available to buyers under the deceptive practices and consumer protection laws
of some jurisdictions are additional examples of supplemental extra-Code law
which have been applied.27
THE BARGAINING PROCESS
Enforceability: Satisfying the Statute of Frauds
Computer contracts for which there is absolutely no writing are probably
unusual, given the substantial and variable price of most software, hardware,
and computer-related components and services. However, in the interests of
reducing contracting costs, parties often use standardized forms, informal mem-
oranda, or other documentation that is not carefully tailored to the transaction
or prepared with the statute of frauds in mind. This can lead to a statute of
frauds challenge, as illustrated by Procyon Corp. v. Components Direct, Inc."8
Components agreed to sell 1,000 computer memory chips to Procyon, guaran-
teeing delivery within six weeks from the date of the oral agreement. Because
Procyon cancelled several previous orders, Components required Procyon to
obtain an irrevocable letter of credit issued to Components's bank. The letter of
credit included a description of the chips, sales price, date of delivery, names of
parties, and the issuing bank's warranty that proper payments would be made
under the terms of the agreement. Components, however, failed to deliver the
chips at the proper time, and Procyon sued Components for breach of the
contract. Components asserted that the contract was unenforceable under
24. Id. at 346, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 641.
25. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
26. John Pagliarulo Bldg. Contractors v. AVCO Fin. Servs. Leasing Co., 512 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The promulgation of U.C.C. article 2A should eliminate the need to resort to
real property law for guidance in the leasing area.
27. U.C.C. § 2-102 (article 2 does not "impair or repeal statutes regulating sales to consumers or
other specified classes of buyers"); see infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
28. 249 Cal. Rptr. 813, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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U.C.C. section 2-201(1) because Components had not signed any writing
sufficient to indicate a contract for sale. 9 Components also argued that the letter
of credit did not constitute a written confirmation "sufficient against the sender"
under the "merchant's confirmation" exception in U.C.C. section 2-201(2)
because it lacked the signature of Procyon's authorized agent."0
The California Court of Appeal disagreed, reasoning that this exception does
not require the sender's own signature on the writing31 because this requirement
would be inconsistent with the exception's policy of encouraging rapid confir-
mations. The court stated that for a writing to be "sufficient against the sender"
the confirmation must satisfy the general statute of frauds requirements of
section 2-201(1). The letter of credit was sufficient to establish a contract
enforceable against Procyon under this standard. The "signing" requirement of
section 2-201(1) was met because Procyon's bank was acting as Procyon's agent
and, under the U.C.C. definition of "signed,"32 the bank's signature on the letter
of credit was equivalent to Procyon's and was "adopted by [Procyon] with
present intention to authenticate" the writing. The description of the transaction
in the letter met the requirement of a writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract had been made. The court stated that one purpose of section 2-201(2) is
to equalize the positions of both parties to a contract so that the party who did
not sign the written confirmation should not be able to "watch a fluctuating
market knowing he can bind but not be bound."33 Because the very purpose of
the letter of credit was to bind Procyon, Components should not be able to assert
that it is not bound.
Establishing Contractual Relations
Unenforceability under the statute of frauds is not the only risk of using
standard forms or informal memoranda in the bargaining process. Contract
29. Id. at 814, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 656. For purposes of the issue presented
in the case, the California statute is identical to the U.C.C. The relevant part of U.C.C. § 2-201(1)
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500
or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent ....
30. 249 Cal. Rptr. at 815, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 657. The relevant part of this
exception provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and
sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its
contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party ....
U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
31. Cf J. White & R. Summers. Uniform Commercial Code 81 (3d ed. 1988) ("the writing
must be 'sufficient against the sender,' that is, it must be signed by him... ").
32. Procyon Corp., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 815, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 658; U.C.C.
§ 1-201(39).
33. Procyon Corp., 249 Cal. Rptr. at 816, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 658.
U.C.C. Survey: Scope of Code 1679
formation issues continue to arise in cases involving the computer industry. As
the plaintiff in United States Leasing Corp. v. City of Chicopee4 discovered, one
must ensure that a contract with a governmental unit has been properly
executed under local government law. In that case, the plaintiff lessor agreed to
buy a computer system and lease it to the city for five years. After two annual
payments, the city became dissatisfied with the system and stopped paying.
When the lessor sued, the city moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that there was no valid contract because the mayor had not signed the contract
as required by the city charter. Citing its strong rule that "one dealing with a
city or town cannot recover if statutory requirements such as are contained in
the [city] charter have not been observed," the court ruled for the city even
though the contract had been signed by the school superintendent and the city
purchasing agent and was supported by the city solicitor's statement that the
agreement was binding.3"
Alloy Computer Products v. Northern Telecom, Inc.3 is another contract
formation case, involving the application of U.C.C. section 2-207."7 In that case,
the plaintiff Alloy regularly purchased tape drive units from defendant North-
ern, a manufacturer. Alloy alleged that one shipment failed to conform to
express warranties of quality, damaging both Alloy and its customers. During
their dealings Alloy sent purchase orders to Northern, which then shipped tape
drives with a document stating "General Terms and Conditions of Sale." These
documents included a "limited warranty" clause limiting the buyer's remedy to
replacement or repair of defective goods. In analyzing this pattern the court
relied on the earlier, much-maligned case of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett &
Co.," which, in applying U.C.C. section 2-207, declared that " 'a response
which states a condition materially altering the obligation solely to the disadvan-
34. 521 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1988).
35. Id. at 743.
36. 683 F. Supp. 12, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1302 (D. Mass. 1988).
37. The relevant portions of this section provide:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on
assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between
merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable
time after notice of them is received.
U.C.C. § 2-207.
38. 297 F.2d 497, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 73 (1st Cir. 1962). The Alloy court noted
that Roto-Lith has been widely criticized but said it was nonetheless binding in the circuit. Alloy
Computer Prods., 683 F. Supp. at 14, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1304.
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tage of the offeror is an acceptance ... expressly ... conditional on assent to the
additional ... terms.' 39
Under this approach Alloy's purchase order was an offer and Northern's
document an acceptance containing a condition that materially altered an
obligation solely to the disadvantage of Alloy by limiting its remedies to repair
or replacement. Alloy assented to this material alteration in terms when it
accepted the tape drives even though the goods were defective.4" Although the
Alloy case may be justified as one in which the parties had a continued pattern
of doing business and therefore the receipt of a shipment accompanied by a
limitation on warranties was to be expected by the buyer, it nonetheless
demonstrates the dangers in ignoring the form documents routinely exchanged
in sales transactions.
Conduct of the parties to an alleged computer agreement and language in the
relevant documents can lead a court to the conclusion that there is no contract at
all. In Jim L. Shetakis Distributing Co. v. Centel Communications Co.,41
language in the sales agreement required that signatures be affixed in a
particular manner. The court applied the long-standing rule that, where cir-
cumstances indicate that a particular manner of contract formation is contem-
plated by the parties, a binding contract is not formed without compliance with
the contemplated procedure."
Silence as Acceptance: The Enforceability of "Shrink-Wrap"
Licenses
Special contract formation problems arise in connection with the sale of mass-
market software. Typically a license agreement on matters such as the copying,
sale, and disassembly of the program is included in the packaging or documen-
tation that accompanies the software. 3 The license purports to condition the
right to use the program on acceptance of its terms and provides that opening
the package legally constitutes acceptance of the license. This approach is
problematic under U.C.C. article 2 or other contract formation principles.44 The
terms are neither called to the attention of nor signed by the purchaser at the
time of the transaction, and the purchaser's silence may reflect ignorance or
misunderstanding rather than informed acquiescence. As a result, there is
serious question whether an "acceptance" and contract formation (on whatever
terms happen to be printed by the manufacturer on the wrapper) can arise from
39. Alloy Computer Prods., 683 F. Supp. at 14, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1304
(quoting Roto-Lith, 297 F.2d at 500, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 76). The Alloy court noted
that, despite the criticism of the Roto-Lih case, it continues as binding precedent in the circuit and
has been cited several times without modification or abandonment.
40. Alloy Computer Prods., 683 F. Supp. at 15, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1305.
41. 756 P.2d 1186 (Nev. 1988).
42. Id. at 1188. The court found the governing legal principle in U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (an offer to
make a contract may be accepted in any reasonable manner unless otherwise unambiguously
indicated by the language or circumstances) and non-Code law.
43. R. Nimmer, The Law of Computer Technology § 6.17121[b] (1985).
44. Id.
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the licensee's opening the plastic. To remedy this and other problems, some
jurisdictions have enacted so-called "shrink-wrap" statutes that mandate the
enforceability of certain license terms notwithstanding problems of traditional
contract formation.
4 5
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd.46 involved the Louisiana "shrink-wrap"
statute.47 Vault produced and copyrighted a very effective anticopying program,
"ProLok," and marketed it under shrink-wrap licenses. Quaid used ProLok not
to achieve anticopying protection, but to develop a software program that would
defeat ProLok's anticopying purpose and permit copying of the very software
that ProLok was intended to protect. Vault asserted that Quaid infringed its
copyright and violated the license agreement and the Louisiana shrink-wrap
statute.48 The Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana statute's severe restrictions
against all copying and sales impermissibly conflicted with the federal Copy-
right Act49 and that the private license agreement would be required to conform
to the federal statute where, as in this case, the state statute was preempted."
Vault apparently did not raise the contract formation issue or assert that tearing
open the wrapper constituted valid acceptance of the terms of the license. Thus
the question remains open as to whether the shrink-wrap license can support a
claim for breach of contract when the contract terms are more restrictive than
the Copyright Act. One might interpret this opinion as suggesting that prudent
vendors of software should draft shrink-wrap licenses to be no more restrictive
than the federal law allows. To the extent that technological advances and Vault
have eroded the copy protections in the software industry, software developers
may seek new federal legislation. This may be the best approach. 1
45. "Shrink-wrap" licenses derive their name from the manner of packaging and mode of
acceptance. The terms of the license agreement are prominently displayed beneath the transparent
cellophane wrapper of the software package. Since the cellophane is heat shrunk to fit the package,
the agreement is known as a "shrink-wrap license." See generally Note, The "Soft" Existing Legal
Protection of Software and the Preemption of State Shrink- Wrap License Enforcement Acts, 8 N. Ill.
U.L. Rev. 531 (1988); Note, The Protection of Computer Software Through Shrink-Wrap License
Agreements, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1350 n.9 (1985).
46. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 775 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1985) (order of dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction reversed). There were virtually no legal precedents confirming the validity of shrink-
wrap licenses for software. Thus, the case generated considerable interest among software vendors
and users. See Ruby, Breaking the Copy-Protection Barriers, PC Week, Apr. 8, 1986, at 45.
47. Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:1961 to 51:1966
(West 1987).
48. Initially there was also a claim that Quaid had violated the Louisiana trade secrets act. 847
F.2d at 268.
49. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
50. 847 F.2d at 269-70. See 17 U.S.C. § 301; C. Knapp, Commercial Damages § 39.02 (1)(a)
(1986). The Vault court further held that a copyright owner's exclusive rights under the Copyright
Act are limited by the user's rights to load the software into its computer and to make an archival
copy of the program. 847 F.2d at 260-67. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 117.
51. Nonuniform state legislative efforts with respect to shrink-wrap licenses could have a
potentially adverse impact on the computer industry. See generally Boss & Woodward, supra note
1, at 1519. Legislative efforts in Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and
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Merger Clauses and Contract Terms
Very often in the negotiation of a computer contract, written technical
specifications are exchanged by the parties but are not expressly incorporated
into the main contract. Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Brockway Imco, Inc.,2
although not a computer contracting case, demonstrates the perils in such a
situation. In connection with its purchase of a machine for manufacturing
plastic bottles (the "ORB VI"), Hoover Universal was presented with a
handout by Imco which summarized certain technical data relating to the
operation of the ORB VI. The handout was distributed by Imco and reviewed
by Hoover Universal during their preliminary negotiations. The final agree-
ment, however, contained both a broad warranty disclaimer, disavowing any
and all warranties and representations as to the ORB VI, and a merger clause
stating, in relevant part: "This Agreement represents the entire understanding
between the parties.""
As could be expected, the ORB VI failed to perform in accordance with the
specifications contained in the handout, and Hoover Universal sued on an
express warranty theory.
The court's analysis was simple. As the sales contract contained a standard
merger clause and made no reference to the specifications relied upon by Hoover
Universal, the parol evidence rule54 precluded the buyer from establishing an
express warranty based upon statements in the handout.5 Furthermore, Hoover
Universal's attempt to introduce evidence of trade usage to explain or supple-
ment the provisions of the agreement was not permitted, as the court determined
that such information would contradict the limitation of warranties provision
contained in the definitive agreement. 6 As a result, Hoover Universal was left
with a piece of equipment that did not perform as expected and without any
way of proving its breach of warranty claim.
The lesson is simple for those who acquire computer hardware or software
systems. If a written specification or other document describing the technical
performance standards of the computer system is important enough to form part
of the basis of the bargain between the parties, make sure that such materials
are specifically incorporated into the final agreement between the parties.
Washington appear to have been abandoned, and the Illinois shrink-wrap statute has been repealed.
Pub. Act 85-254, 1987 I11. Laws vol. 1 at 1538. Alternative legal and marketing strategies also seem
to be developing. For example, users with multiple computer needs may be offered deep discounts
for additional copies of software to be used in the same company. See generally Taylor, The Master
Copiers, PC Mag., Jan. 14, 1986, at 178.
52. 809 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 1042.
54. U.C.C. § 2-202.
55. 809 F.2d at 1043. The statements in the handout were in fact incorrect, but neither Hoover
Universal nor Imco was aware of the inaccuracy.
56. Id.
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The Problem of Meaning: Interpreting the Contract
The great majority of computer contracts provide little opportunity to dispute
the actual existence of an enforceable agreement. However, the written and oral
language and conduct which clearly create a contract of some sort may still be
ambiguous as to the exact terms. Computer contracts may be a particularly rich
source for disputes concerning the interpretation of bargains 7 because the
subject matter of these contracts is often very complex and expensive, yet market
pressures force the parties to negotiate the contracts quickly and with a
minimum of deliberation. Determining the meaning of many computer con-
tracts may also be difficult because the rapidly changing technology and stan-
dards of the industry give little guidance to the courts. Moreover, the specialized
terms used in the industry often have multiple meanings. For example, "soft-
ware" lacks a uniform meaning and is defined differently by different experts in
the computer field.5" Of course, all of this highlights the need for careful
drafting to minimize disputes.59
Storage Technology Corp. v. Trust Co. of New Jersey"5 illustrates the impor-
tance in contract interpretation of accepted and provable industry standards.
This case involved cross allegations of default under a lease of peripheral
computer hardware and software. Trust Company, as lessee of the equipment,
had invoked a lease provision for upgrade of the equipment to make it compati-
ble with a new computer. Storage Technology, the lessor, refused, claiming that
the lease did not require it to make the requested upgrade but only required it to
make "field installable upgrades.""1 Trust Company contended that the provi-
sion was unambiguous and could be construed from the plain meaning in the
lease to cover any equipment substitution (presumably because all upgrades are
ultimately installed in the field). However, the court accepted Storage Technol-
ogy's view that the phrase was not "plain and unambiguous."62 It thereby
allowed expert testimony to show that the lease required only an equipment
upgrade which could be installed on an existing piece of equipment in the field
by an engineer without shipment of that equipment to another location. Since
57. See, e.g., Brook Mays Music Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 838 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir.
1988) (whether an arbitration clause applies to the sale of a second computer system); Cullinet
Software, Inc. v. McCormack & Dodge Corp., 400 Mass. 775, 511 N.E.2d 1101 (1987) (whether a
software license included worldwide rights to use and sublicense the software at the end of a five-
year period).
58. Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35
Emory L.J. 853, 856-57, 866-67 nn.54-56 (1986).
59. Sperry Corp. v. United States, 845 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Unisys Corp.
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 542 (1988) (appeal arising out of an inartfully drawn provision in an
agreement).
60. 842 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 55.
62. Id. at 56.
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the requested upgrade could not be done in the field, Storage Technology's
interpretation of the lease prevailed."
Another recent interpretation case involved the issue of acceptance of the
supplier's performance under a contract for the construction and delivery of a
complex computer-controlled navigational aid.64 In the course of its analysis, the
court examined the contract's terms and extrinsic evidence including course of
performance."5 The case highlights how important it is for vendor and vendee in
a computer contract to define explicitly when acceptance of the vendor's perfor-
mance occurs.6" Contracts for computer hardware and software often include
clauses requiring performance testing after installation. Although it seems
obvious that a vendee would not "accept" computer products before they
undergo contractually specified tests, parties to these agreements should specify
in their writing that acceptance of hardware and software will occur only after
testing is concluded. In addition, the contract should clearly define how comple-
tion of the testing is to be documented. Even though the negotiation of perfor-
mance testing and acceptance criteria is perhaps one of the most difficult and
controversial considerations in any contract, the benefits from anticipating and
addressing the problems are apparent.
Similarly, computer leases commonly contain termination clauses relating to
obsolescence of equipment, and their interpretation is frequently a cause of
dispute which might be avoided by cautious drafting.67 Ambiguous express
warranties also can lead to litigation.66
63. Id. Although the court did not rely on the U.C.C., this result could have been reached under
the Code. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) provides that a written agreement intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement can be explained or supplemented "by course of dealing, usage of
trade, or by course of performance." See also U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208. Storage Technology
submitted expert evidence as to a specific meaning within the computer industry of the phrase "field
installable upgrade," and that view was accepted by the court. Until the adoption of U.C.C. article
2A, which deals with this in § 2A-202, if a lease of goods is involved, it may be appropriate to apply
an article 2 sale of goods analysis to computer leases.
64. Sperry Corp. v. United States, 845 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Unisys Corp.
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 542 (1988).
65. Id. at 968-70. U.C.C. § 2-208 permits evidence of course of performance for interpretive
purposes.
66. The significance of this for article 2 purposes is that, with limited exceptions, acceptance of
the goods ends the vendee's option to return the goods to the vendor following breach. Unless the
vendee can "revoke acceptance," the vendee will be limited to the remedy of damages for breach.
U.C.C. § 2-608. In Sperry, 845 F.2d at 968, the significance was that the government had to
exercise an option within 120 days following "acceptance"; the parties in litigation disagreed on
whether the government's attempted exercise of the option was timely.
67. See, e.g., Zayre Corp. v. Computer Sys. of Am., 511 N.E.2d 23, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 559, rev.
denied, 400 Mass. 1107, 513 N.E.2d 1289 (1987).
68. See, e.g., Word Management Corp. v. Information Sys., 525 N.Y.S.2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988). The court there noted that neither the contract's merger clause nor the parol evidence rule
(U.C.C. § 2-202) would prohibit collateral evidence concerning express warranties because such
evidence would not modify or contradict the terms of the contract but would explain ambiguities in
the contract. See also U.C.C. § 2-316(1). The contract referred to the seller's "standard specifica-
tions," indicating that it was not the entire agreement of the parties. 525 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
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The court resolved several interpretation problems arising from contract
language in Shauers v. Board of County Commissioners.6" The case involved a
programmer and customer fighting over ownership of the programmer's work
product. Shauers agreed with Sweetwater County that she would provide
programming services. She developed several programs, some of which were
sold to other counties with her oral (but not written) consent although the
contract required written consent for any transfer."0 In the later dispute between
Shauers and Sweetwater County, the court split ownership of the software into
three components. Since neither the contract nor the works-for-hire doctrine
covered the material objects embodying the programs and since the deal con-
tained elements of a sale, the material objects belonged to the county. As to the
ideas and concepts behind the programs, the court held, based on the contract
language,7 that these belonged to Shauers. As to the right to transfer the
programs, the court held that a triable question of fact existed, and it reversed
the district court's order granting summary judgment. While the contract
language clearly reserved this right for Shauers, there was disagreement about
the exact terms of the oral agreement allowing sales to other counties.7"
COMPUTER PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Claims by dissatisfied vendees typically present a cluster of U.C.C. article 2
issues concerning the existence or breach of express or implied warranties, the
efficacy of warranty disclaimer or limitation of remedy clauses, and so forth.7
There is a continuing trend of cases in which purchasers attempt to avoid
limitations imposed by the Code and obtain "justice" outside its scope. These
cases also commonly include tort claims sounding in misrepresentation or
negligence. The frequency of fraud claims in the computer field may be related
to numerous factors, including the industry's rapid technological change (which
can make once-attractive bargains look less desirable) and, perhaps, excessive
"puffery." 74 The service component of many computer contracts (e.g., the
modification of hardware or customizing of software) may be a source of claims
sounding in negligence. Tort claims may also be brought to avoid either
contractual limits on the vendor's warranty liability or very heavy-handed
vendor documentation.
69. 746 P.2d 444 (Wyo. 1987).
70. Id. at 446.
71. The agreement in Shauers contained the following clause:
In addition, Sydney [Shauers] shall not be required to keep confidential any ideas, concepts, or
techniques relating to data processing which are submitted or developed in the course of this
agreement by Sydney or jointly by Sydney and Customer's personnel.... This agreement and
any of the programs or materials to which it applies may not be assigned or otherwise
transferred without prior written consent from Sydney.
Id. at 446.
72. Id. at 449.
73. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1532.
74. Id.
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Vendee's Warranty Claims
The pace of warranty-related computer cases continued unabated during the
current survey year. The cases are highly fact-specific and often turn on
language in the relevant contractual memoranda. However, some general les-
sons can be drawn from the opinions. It is apparent that vendors continue to
employ all means available under U.C.C. article 2 to tailor their warranty
exposure. It is equally apparent that these efforts sometimes fail, because of
poor drafting, failure to observe Code requirements, lack of agreement by the
vendee, or other reasons. The cases suggest that vendors must give careful
attention to each of the legal techniques employed to develop vendor warranty
liability, because one technique may succeed even if others fail. Defenses such as
the vendee's misuse of the warranted product are frequently alleged, but may be
unavailing if the contract fails to outline clearly the responsibilities of each party
for installation, programming, maintenance, and so forth. Moreover, vendors
should consider using documentation that reflects the expected quality of their
products; use of extreme warranty limitations and exclusions, which may have
been appropriate in an earlier age of unreliable software and hardware prod-
ucts, encourages vendees and courts to resort to tort law or other approaches to
strike down the limitations.
Vendors also should be aware that their behavior during the bargaining
process may give rise to warranties, either express or implied. In particular,
courts have imposed warranty liability on vendors who were aware of their
customers' unique computer system needs and were aware that their customers
possessed relatively sparse knowledge of computer systems, and therefore should
have been aware that their customers were relying on their knowledge and skill
in providing the appropriate product to meet customers' needs."
Turning to specific computer products liability cases, Kearney & Trecker
Corp. v. Master Engraving Co."6 is representative. It involved a dispute between
Kearney, a manufacturer of computer controlled machine tools, and Master, a
producer of industrial components. The machine purchased by Master did not
perform adequately, and Master asserted a variety of defects and claimed, inter
alia, damages for lost profits on customer orders unfilled because of the defects.
Kearney asserted that the problems were due to Master's improper program-
ming of the machine. The purchase agreement provided for a narrowly defined
express warranty,77 disclaimed all other warranties," disclaimed consequential
damages,79 and limited Master's remedies to repair or replacement of defective
parts or return of the product with a purchase price refund."s
75. See, e.g., Hollingsworth Enters. v. Software House, Inc., 32 Ohio App. 3d 61, 513 N.E.2d
1372 (1986).
76. 527 A.2d 429, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1684 (N.J. 1987).
77. Id. at 431, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1687; U.C.C. § 2-316.
78. 527 A.2d at 431, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1687; U.C.C. § 2-316.
79. 527 A.2d at 431, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1687; U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
80. 527 A.2d at 431, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1687; U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
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The trial judge had charged the jury that if Kearney failed to make the
machine operate as warranted, then the jury could award consequential dam-
ages irrespective of the consequential damages exclusion. The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed. It found that the "repair or replace" remedy and the
exclusion of consequential damages were two independent contractual provi-
sions, and it reasoned that even if the "repair or replace" remedy failed of its
essential purpose, it would not automatically cause the consequential damages
exclusion to fail.8 The court stated that a consequential damages exclusion is
invalid only when it is inconsistent with the intent and reasonable commercial
expectations of the parties, for example, upon the manufacturer's repudiation of
its repair or replace obligations.82
The U.C.C. rule that a vendee is not bound by a limited remedy83 if that
remedy fails of its essential purpose was also involved in Harper Tax Services v.
Quick Tax Ltd.84 Two computer-based accounting services had ordered Quick
Tax computer software to prepare 1982 state and federal tax returns. The
accounting services now claimed fraud and breach of contract in that: the
programs Quick Tax originally delivered were designed for the 1981 tax year,
not 1982; the replacement software also contained defects; and corrected pro-
grams were not received until after the April 15, 1983, filing deadlines. The
software license agreement warranted that the program would be free of
program coding errors when delivered; the agreement disclaimed all other
warranties.8" Further, the agreement purported to limit the licensee's remedies
to corrections at licensor's expense and to disclaim all liability for consequential
damages. The accounting services argued that Quick Tax's inability to provide
suitable software for the 1982 tax season caused the exclusive remedy to fail of
its essential purpose, making available all U.C.C. buyers' remedies.86
The court agreed that there was evidence that the limited remedy had failed.
Yet, like the court in Kearney, it distinguished the limited remedy from the
exclusion of consequential damages, explaining that the essential purpose test
applied to the former, but not to the latter.87 The court noted that under the
U.C.C., consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the exclusion
is unconscionable88 and-absent any suggestion of undue influence, force, or
threats to sign the agreement-there was no evidence of unconscionability, even
though the form agreement was an adhesion contract.8"
81. 527 A.2d at 437, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1697; U.C.C. § 2-179(2). The court
adopted the reasoning in Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register, 635 F.2d 1081, 30 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 416 (3d Cir. 1980).
82. 527 A.2d at 438, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1698.
83. U.C.C. § 2-179(2).
84. 686 F. Supp. 109, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 408 (D. Md. 1988).
85. Id. at 111, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 412.
86. Id. at 112, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 412-13.
87. Id., 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 412-13.
88. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
89. The court consulted the general unconscionability provision of article 2, U.C.C. § 2-302, and
stated that the existence of superior bargaining power and consequent use of an adhesion contract
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Word Management Corp. v. AT&T Information Systems" also involved
warranty issues. The buyer of computer communications equipment alleged
that the seller breached an express warranty 91 and the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 92 The court determined
that the express warranty and disclaimer language were ambiguous and incom-
plete and, consequently, that it was inappropriate to dismiss the express
warranty claim.93 The court did, however, dismiss the implied warranty claims
because the written contract clearly and conspicuously disclaimed them pursu-
ant to the U.C.C. requirements.94
Sometimes it is argued that a warranty disclaimer that meets U.C.C. article 2
requirements is nonetheless unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. On
the other hand, there is case authority that a disclaimer that complies with these
requirements is per se conscionable and effective. 95 In Meeting Makers, Inc. v.
American Airlines,9" the court entertained a claim of disclaimer unconscionabil-
ity but held that the disclaimer was enforceable because the computer lessee
failed to establish that the parties had unequal bargaining power. The facts
indicated that the lessee had a real voice in setting the contract terms. This case
and the others discussed here suggest the need for careful definition of vendors'
warranty responsibilities and their limits.
Finally, some businesses apparently need reminding that, in appropriate
circumstances, a warrantor can cut off warranty defenses to payment by
assigning its rights to a third party. This was the situation in Norstar Bank v.
Corrigan,9 where the lessor was in bankruptcy and the assignee bank was suing
the lessee to recover on a computer lease. The lease permitted the lessor to
assign and specified that "assignee shall have all rights and remedies of Lessor
... and shall hold this Lease free of any counterclaim, offset, defense or cross-
complaint ... Lessee reserving such remedies solely against the Lessor."99 This
"waiver of defenses" clause was upheld where the evidence showed that the
assignee took the assignment in good faith and without notice of the claims or
defenses. 9 The court therefore disregarded the lessee's claims that the lessor had
was not sufficient to establish unconscionability. llarper, 686 F. Supp. at 112, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) at 413.
90. 525 N.Y.S.2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). This case is discussed initially supra at notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
91. U.C.C. § 2-313.
92. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
93. 525 N.Y.S.2d at 435. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Word Management court's approach to interpretation issues.
94. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3).
95. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 31, at 532-43.
96. 513 So. 2d 700, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
97. 519 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
98. Id. at 447-48.
99. U.C.C. § 9-206. The court also opined that constructive notice in such cases would place
undue burdens on banks and financing agencies. 519 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
U.C.C. Survey: Scope of Code 1689
breached express and implied warranties and that the contract was void because
of the lessor's fraudulent inducement.
100
FRAUD CLAIMS
A vendor may also find itself subject to claims of fraud or misrepresentation.
A disappointed vendee is most likely to include such allegations where its
recollection of what was promised during the bargaining process differs mark-
edly from what is actually provided in the computer contract warranty.' The
tort allegations also may be an attempt to avoid the effect of contract provisions
limiting the vendor's warranty exposure. While it is arguable that business
vendees generally should be limited to warranty relief,'02 some courts may
recognize a separate tort claim.
Election of remedies is sometimes a threshold remedial issue in a case
involving allegations of fraud. In Guernsey Petroleum Corp. v. Data General
Corp.,'10 3 the court stated a familiar election rule:
"Where fraud in the inducement is alleged, the pleader has a choice
between rescinding the contract or affirming it. If he rescinds he is not
bound by any of its provisions, but in order to rescind successfully he must
return or offer to return the subject matter of the sale in order to place the
seller in the same situation in which he was prior to the transaction. If he
affirms and suffers damages he is entitled to recover those damages which
he can prove, but he is bound by the contract, having elected to stand upon
''. )104it., 0
The court in Guernsey Petroleum also distinguished fraud from puffing, finding
that statements made by a second defendant to Guernsey did not amount to
fraud in view of the business sophistication of the plaintiff and the court's
judgment that reliance on the misstatements would not have been "reasonable"
under the circumstances.'
Typical fraud claims were involved in Word Management Corp. v. AT& T
Information Systems.' °6 The court determined that the allegations stated a fraud
cause of action because the plaintiff claimed a representation of fact which (i)
was either untrue and known to be untrue or recklessly made, and (ii) was
offered to deceive and induce the other party, causing injury.'0 7
100. 519 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
101. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1533.
102. Id. at 1535-36.
103. 359 S.E.2d 920 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
104. Id. at 922 (quoting Garrett v. Diamond, 144 Ga. App. 428, 430, 240 S.E.2d 912, 914 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1977)).
105. Id. at 923-24.
106. Word Management Corp. v. AT&T Information Sys., 525 N.Y.S.2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988). This case is also discussed supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
107. 525 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
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The plaintiff did not fare so well in Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business
Systems.' The case involved Olivetti's continued supply of a particular ma-
chine to Ames, a vendor. Ames alleged that Olivetti made material misrepresen-
tations about its continued support for the machine and that these statements
entitled it to damages for fraud. The court proceeded through a traditional
fraud analysis, affirming the trial court's findings on misrepresentation, materi-
ality, and the reasonableness of reliance. But it found that Ames had not proven
damages with sufficient certainty to support a judgment for over $1.2 million. 10 9
Ames emerged from its appeal with no damages for fraud110 and owing money
on the system it had purchased. In the course of its opinion, the court rejected
the "new business rule" for North Carolina.'
In Harper Tax Services v. Quick Tax Ltd.,"2 certain fraud-related issues
were resolved in a manner favorable to the vendor, Quick Tax. The vendee, a
provider of accounting services, claimed negligent as well as intentional misrep-
resentation. The court accepted the vendor's argument that damages for fraud
did not include lost profits under the New York approach and indicated that the
negligent misrepresentation claim would be subject to the liability and remedy
limitations contained in the license agreement."1
The effect of contractual liability limitations on a vendor's fraud liability was
also an issue in Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm. 14 There the vendee claimed
that the vendor failed properly to program a computerized alarm system. The
vendee-jeweler alleged that the vendor's personnel knowingly misrepresented
that the system was fully functional. Afterwards, the jeweler was robbed and the
alarm failed, and the jeweler sued for breach of contract, negligence, and fraud.
The contract limited the vendor's liability to a fraction of the jeweler's loss and
the question was what effect the contract should have on the various claims. 1
The court upheld the damages limitation with respect to the breach of contract
and negligence counts because the parties had dealt at arm's length and the
limitation was not unconscionable. Nonetheless, the court permitted the jeweler
to pursue the fraud claim free of the limitation, suggesting that a limitation of
damages clause may not protect a vendor against a claim of deliberate misrepre-
sentation." 6 The case is consistent with others in this factually sensitive area.'
108. 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578, reh'g denied, 320 N.C. 639, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987).
109. Id. at 541-43, 356 S.E.2d at 583-84.
110. Id. at 549, 356 S.E.2d at 587.
111. Id. at 546, 356 S. E.2d at 585. This is a rule of law that precludes a "new business" from
proving damages for profits lost as a result of breach on the grounds that the damages are as a
matter of law too speculative. The Olivetti court ruled, instead, that such damages must simply be
proved with reasonable certainty.
112. 686 F. Supp. 109, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 408 (D. Md. 1988). This case is
initially discussed supra at note 84 and accompanying text.
113. 686 F. Supp. at 113.
114. 520 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1987).
115. Id. at 565.
116. 1d. at 567.
117. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1533-40.
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Finally, Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Rountree"' will remind the
contractor that a written contract can destroy a fraudulent inducement claim
and that reading a contract is essential in the contracting process. In Citicorp,
the defendant originally contracted to purchase computer equipment. After the
vendee had made several payments, the plaintiff represented that it could
arrange to lower the vendee's payments for equipment. A sales representative
then presented the vendee with a sixty-month lease and an indemnification
agreement, and stated that "nothing would change" if the vendee signed these
agreements." 9 The vendee complied without reading the documents. The vendee
(who was now the lessee) stopped making payments when the equipment
proved unsatisfactory and was sued by the lessor for breach of the lease.'
The court reversed a jury verdict for the defendant for lack of triable facts,
pointing out that the defendant was experienced in business and able to read,
and that given the writing, defendant's fraud claim had to fail.' Moreover, the
court held that the lease, being a true lease, was not a sale subject to the
provisions of U.C.C. article 2.12
Other Bases for Vendor Liability
Purchasers of computer equipment who believe they have been "taken" may
be able to enhance their damage recovery through the jurisdiction's deceptive
trade practice or consumer protection statutes. For example, in Sun Power, Inc.
v. Adams,' the plaintiff, a convenience store operator, purchased a computer-
ized cash register that the defendant office equipment dealer represented as
IBM compatible. It was not, and a replacement register constantly broke down
and was irreparable. The defendant refused to attempt further repairs or to
refund the purchase price, prompting the plaintiff to allege that defendant's
actions were "unconscionable" under the Texas trade practices act.'24 The
118. 364 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
119. Id. at 66-67.
120. Id. at 67.
121. Id. at 68.
122. On the issue of lease or sale, the court stated:
[I]t is clear that the lease is not equivalent to a sale by appellant and a purchase by appellees of
computer equipment. The lease provided for 60 monthly payments of $711.22. Title to the
equipment was at all times to remain in appellant. The lease contained no provision which
required or even permitted appellees to purchase the equipment at the end of the lease. Instead,
the agreement provided that the equipment was to be returned to appellant at the end of the
lease.
Id. at 68. In view of the speed at which computer equipment loses value, one wonders what value
the parties contemplated the equipment would have at the end of the lease and whether it would
have been more trouble than it was worth for the lessor to retrieve the equipment. See generally
Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under the UCC, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 195 (1988).
123. 751 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). For earlier cases dealing with application of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act to computer-related contracts, see Boss & Woodward, supra
note 1, at 1539.
124. 751 S.W.2d at 695 (applying Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987)).
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appeals court found that the jury could have concluded that the defendant's
conduct was unconscionable by taking unfair advantage of plaintiff, or that the
gross disparity in the value paid for the worthless cash register amounted to
unconscionability. However, the plaintiff was not entitled to statutory damages





Aubrey's R.V. Center v. Tandy Corp."6 involved a suit for rescission of a
contract to purchase a computer system from Tandy. Tandy had attempted to
resolve the problems with the system for more than a year. The basic question
before the court was whether a buyer could sue for "rescission" under the Code
and, if so, how. Resolving the question in Aubrey's (the buyer's) favor, the court
noted that the rescission concept is encompassed by the term "revocation of
acceptance" under the Code.'27 The court concluded that, under the facts,
Aubrey's had met the Code requirements for this remedy. 2 The court decided
that Aubrey's had made out a case for "substantial impairment of value" even
though only parts of the system failed, that buyer's notice was seasonable, and
that its continued use of the system did not bar revocation of acceptance under
the facts.' 29 The court also held that the buyer's finance charges were a proper
element of damages since the objective of the remedy was to restore the status
quo ante."'
In Synscort, Inc. v. Indata Services,' the court refused to accelerate the
payments on a three-year lease of computer software or award lessor judgment
for the total payments under the lease. The contract permitted the defendant
lessee to terminate the agreement within sixty days of installation without
further obligation; the defendant terminated about one and one half months
after the contractual grace period by returning all materials to the lessor. To
support its denial of the full lease payments, the court stated that the plaintiff
was seeking specific performance of the agreement and brought "all principles
of equity into consideration, not merely those raised by the parties."' 2 Empha-
125. Id. at 696. The vendor under a lease/purchase agreement for a computer system was not so
fortunate in Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Abbick, 243 Kan. 513, 757 P.2d 304 (1988). Its
liability under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act included $15,000 worth of punitive damages
and the vendee's attorney's fees.
126. 46 Wash. App. 595, 731 P.2d 1124, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 105 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987).
127. U.C.C. § 2-608.
128. 46 Wash. App. at 600-01, 731 P.2d at 1127-28, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at
106.
129. Id. at 602-05, 731 P.2d at 1128-30, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 106-07.
130. Id. at 607-08, 731 P.2d at 1131, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 109.
131. 14 Conn. App. 481, 541 A.2d 543 (Conn. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 209 Conn. 804, 548
A.2d 443 (1988).
132. Id. at 484, 541 A.2d at 545.
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sizing that the plaintiff, by stipulation, had used the program only once, and
analogizing a recovery of full lease payments to a prohibited penalty provision,
the court denied what it termed "an unconscionable windfall for the plain-
tiff."' 33 It should be noted that the result in the Synscort case could well be
different under the new U.C.C. article 2A on leases, which both validates
accelerated rental provisions and allows a lessor to recover for future rentals
reduced to present value (whether or not an acceleration clause appears in the
lease)-however, minus an offset based on the "market rent" for the remaining
term of the lease.
134
Vendees' Damages
Vendees often purchase computer hardware and software with great expecta-
tions of enhanced operating efficiency and all the business benefits that may flow
from it. They are disappointed if the installation of the computer products takes
longer than expected, or if they ultimately do not realize all the anticipated
capabilities. Serious and expensive business disruptions can occur during the
installation period and thereafter if the system fails to perform. If the vendee's
disappointment is compensable under a warranty or some other theory, then its
burden becomes one of proving damages. Challenging the vendee's proof of the
alleged damages may be the vendor's final line of defense against a substantial
judgment because it can be difficult to place a monetary value on the vendee's
alleged disappointment and increased costs and to demonstrate that they are
causally linked to the vendor's breach. Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc."'5
illustrates some of these proof problems. Although it was decided under Louisi-
ana's Civil Code, the U.C.C. could generate results comparable to those found
by the Louisiana court.
Software contracted to furnish a customized software system that would
perform accounting functions including specially designed applications based on
the needs of the vendee, Photo Copy. Most important was the ability to pull up
a customer's name from only an invoice number. Photo Copy contended that it
relied on Software's promises and that the software was defective. 36 Software
conceded that its product did not provide invoice-to-customer cross-referencing
and certain other features. However, it argued that it had not been given the
opportunity to perform before Photo Copy declared a default.
133. Id. at 485, 541 A.2d at 545.
134. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-109, 2A-528(1) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
135. 510 So. 2d 1337 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
136. Id. at 1339. Photo Copy claimed that the software was redhibitorily defective (meaning that
it is either absolutely useless, or its use is so inconvenient that it must be supposed that the buyer
would not have purchased it if the buyer knew of the defect). It sought recovery under Louisiana
law holding sellers liable for damages and attorney's fees if they fail to declare known vices in things
sold, and presuming that manufacturers know of defects in their products. Id.; see La. Civ. Code
Ann. arts. 2520, 2545 (West 1972). The court determined that the presumption applied because
Software was the "effective manufacturer" of the program. 510 So. 2d at 1340.
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This defense failed because the evidence showed that cross-referencing was
not available and could never be installed. Software's liability included return of
the down payment on the program, the cost of customized statements purchased
by Photo Copy that were not usable without the software, and reasonable
attorney's fees. 37 The court also reasoned that there should be no recovery for
hours spent entering data because "this is to be expected in any new system.' '
3 8
While this latter conclusion may make sense with respect to time spent simply
entering raw data, where substantial effort is expended adjusting the data base
to conform to the requirements of the new software, this arguably might be
determined to be incidental or consequential damages. Photo Copy also was
denied recovery for the costs of mass market software purchased after the
custom program failed, allegedly to mitigate damages." 9
With the exception of the award of attorney's fees 40 and assuming that
U.C.C. article 2 applies to the software transaction, the opinion in Photo Copy
fits comfortably within the framework of article 2. In article 2 terms, it would
seem that Software tendered nonconforming goods that Photo Copy rejected,' 4'
and Software was unable to cure its tender. 4 Photo Copy was then entitled to
recover its down payment and incidental and consequential damages.43
Consequential damages were at issue in Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Termi-
nal Systems.' In that case, defendant agreed to install cash registers that would
communicate with any Wang computer. When installed, the registers never
communicated and ultimately had to be replaced. The damages at issue were
increased labor costs plaintiff sustained because the cash registers failed to
communicate as promised; seller challenged these because it (seller) did not
know of the general or particular needs of the plaintiff's business at the time of
contracting. Sensibly observing that, given the product and the defect, increased
labor costs for any buyer were foreseeable, the court held them recoverable
under U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(a).'45
137. 510 So. 2d at 1340-41. Photo Copy was not, however, allowed to recover overtime wages
for a bookkeeper who allegedly was required to do more work because of defects in the program:
Photo Copy's proof failed to negate the possibility that the extra work was the fault of the employee
who was not a "computer person." Id. at 1340.
138. Id. at 1340.
139. Id. at 1341.
140. See 2 R. Anderson, Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 11:34 (1988).
141. 510 So. 2d at 1339-40; see U.C.C. § 2-508.
142. 510 So. 2d at 1340; see U.C.C. § 2-508.
143. 510 So. 2d at 1340-41; see U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-712, 2-715; cf. § 2-718. There was
apparently no evidence that the cost of the substitute program was greater than the defective
program, thereby perhaps entitling the plaintiff to the difference between the "cover" price and the
contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-712.
144. 732 P.2d 719, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 943 (Kan. 1987).
145. Id. at 725, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 952 ("The submission of data from the
cash registers to the mainline computer on sales, payrolls, inventory, etc. is a common feature of
such equipment and the failure of the cash registers to do so would foreseeably create additional
labor costs for the afflicted retail merchants.").
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Vendors' Remedies and Damages
The customer isn't always right, in which case the vendor may be entitled to a
remedy and damages. In the case of a software contract, questions can arise
concerning whether the proper measure of vendor's damages is the license fee,
reimbursement for development expenses, lost profits, or some other standard.14 6
For example, in Third Party Software, Inc. v. Tesar Meats, Inc.,"'4 7 the vendor
had designed a special program for Tesar Meats, but when the system was
ready for installation, Tesar was unable to use it. Following breach the vendor
disposed of as much of the equipment as it could and brought suit. The main
issue was the proper measure of damages for the failure of the customer to
accept the system. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that, given the theory on
which the case was tried, the proper measure of damages was reimbursement
for out-of-pocket costs and other expenses attributable to the contract, and not
the full amount of the contract payments still due from the vendee. 4 In effect,
the court deprived the vendor of the benefit of its bargain, because custom
software, once developed, has little residual value to the vendor. Hence, the
Nebraska decision may be a bit harsh.
Defining the Computer Enterprise
The development of functional software, hardware, or a computer system
requires skill and expertise often not possessed by a single individual or business
organization. Consequently, such projects are typically undertaken by multiple
actors who may neglect to formalize their relationship inter se (e.g., independent
contractors, employer/employee, contractor/subcontractor, joint ventures, etc.).
Color Connection, Inc. v. Juneau4 ' shows that this ambiguity can lead to
uncertainty concerning the actors' contractual liability to third parties or the
ownership of assets employed in the project.
Color Connection was in the photographic processing business. Juneau
operated a computer services business that did business as Southern Microtech.
An individual named Womack did business as Q.E.D. Microengineering. Color
Connection and Juneau discussed the installation of a computer system in Color
Connection's lab. Juneau indicated that it could obtain hardware and assist
with programming but lacked certain other expertise. Womack subsequently
applied for a job with Juneau, displaying a resume claiming expertise of the
sort needed to install the system. Color Connection testified that Juneau advised
that Juneau "had someone who was able to help put [Color Connection's] ...
desired computer system together."'50 Juneau arranged a meeting between
146. Assuming the Code applies, the relevant U.C.C. remedies and damages provisions include
§§ 2-703, 2-706, 2-708, 2-709, and 2-710. A vendee may fail to meet its payment responsibilities for
the purchase or lease of computer hardware, in which case it may be held liable for the price or
unpaid lease payments. See All Star Video, Inc. v. Baeder, 730 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1986).
147. 226 Neb. 628, 414 N.W.2d 244 (1987).
148. Id. at 630-33, 414 N.W.2d at 245-46.
149. 505 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
150. Id. at 915.
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Womack and Color Connection to discuss the project, which was followed by a
proposal, prepared by Juneau and Womack, employing Juneau's hardware
price list and describing the equipment, its price, the cost of labor, and payment
and completion terms. The proposal was on Southern Microtech (Juneau's)
stationery, and contained the name "Clarence A. Womack, d/b/a Q.E.D.
Microengineering." The proposal did not allocate duties between Juneau and
Womack or provide for separate payments to them. However, Color Connection
issued separate checks after entering into an oral contract based upon the
proposal.'
After the project failed, Juneau contended that its obligation was limited to
delivery and installation of hardware, and that Womack independently con-
tracted to program the system and tie it together. Juneau claimed that the
proposal was Womack's and that Womack lacked authority to use Southern
Microtech (Juneau's) stationery. Juneau cited the separate checks in support of
its theory of distinct contractual obligations. However, Juneau admitted that its
performance went beyond supplying and installing hardware, at least after the
project fell behind schedule. There was also evidence that some equipment was
supplied by Womack. Of course, Color Connection contended that Juneau and
Womack were each liable for the installation of a functional system as demon-
strated by the proposal, their performance, and the fact that Color Connection
was not informed of separate contracts during negotiations.15 The Louisiana
principle of solidary liability 153 rendered both Juneau and Womack liable to
Color Connection for the contract price and they were held to be co-owners of
equipment acquired for the project.54
Failure to describe clearly the relationship inter se of actors in a business
relationship, apparently a fairly common problem in the computer industry, can
have other serious consequences. For example, it can lead to uncertainty
concerning the capital contribution or other obligations of the actors with
respect to the new venture.'55 Computer cases during the current survey year
suggest that failure to observe legal formalities during the course of the com-
puter enterprise could also result in the personal liability of shareholders or
directors.156
151. Id.
152. See id. at 915-16.
153. A solidary obligation is one in which each obligor is liable for the whole performance and
performance by one obligor relieves the other of liability toward the obligee. La. Civ. Code Ann. art.
1794 (West 1987).
154. 505 So. 2d at 918.
155. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, 322 N.C. 42, 366 S.E.2d 433 (1988).
156. See, e.g., Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1988) (director is
personally liable for debts when he carries on business of a dissolved corporation in violation of
Virginia law); Wang Laboratories v. Dataword Corp., 680 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (claim
that corporate veil should be pierced on account of undercapitalization).
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DECISION MAKERS
Some computer contract cases are decided in administrative tribunals or in
binding arbitration. This may give rise to specialized jurisdictional issues. An
example is Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States.'57 In 1987, the Air Force
awarded a contract to IBM to upgrade a central processing unit used on board
various weapons systems. Pacificorp, the disappointed bidder, protested the
award and IBM intervened and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the
General Services Board of Contract Appeals ("GSBCA"). The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the GSBCA had no jurisdiction to
resolve the bid protest." 8 The General Services Administration ("GSA") lacked
authority to procure automated data processing equipment or services on behalf
of the Department of Defense if it involved equipment integral to a weapons
system or critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions.
Logically, the court concluded, the GSA's authority to hear bid protests coin-
cides with its procurement authority, so it had no jurisdiction over the bid
protest. 58 The case has broad implications, since similar classification issues
could arise in the context of contract formation and the procurement authority
of a government contractor.
Arbitrability came up in Geldermann, Inc. v. Mullins,6 ' another case in
which ownership of a custom program was at issue. 6' In Geldermann, defen-
dant Mullins developed a program as an employee of the plaintiff, a company
that conducted ninety percent of its business with the Chicago Board of Trade
("CBOT"). He later hired a consultant to modify the program, quit, and took
the new program with him. When plaintiff sued, Mullins claimed that the
dispute was arbitrable under the CBOT rule requiring arbitration of "any
controversy ... which arises out of the Exchange business" of the parties.
Relying on the public policy favoring arbitration as an easier, faster way of
resolving disputes, the court concluded that Geldermann's business was suffi-
ciently exchange-related to bring it within the CBOT's arbitration require-
ment.'62
Grobet File Co. v. RTC Systems.. was an action to confirm an arbitrator's
award. Grobet had agreed to purchase IBM hardware from RTC, along with
"vanilla" programs devised and marketed by RTC."" RTC was to furnish
twelve programs under a software license and to modify the software to serve
Grobet's purposes. The software portion of the agreement was embodied in
157. 852 F.2d 549 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
158. Id. at 551.
159. Id.
160. 524 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
161. See also Shauers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 746 P.2d 444 (Wyo. 1987), discussed supra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
162. Geldermann, 524 N.E.2d at 1216.
163. 524 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. App. Ct.), rev. denied, 403 Mass. 1101, 526 N.E.2d 1295 (1988).
164. "Vanilla" programs apparently referred to standard programs developed for general
purposes.
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RTC's standard form licensing contract for the vanilla programs, plus eleven
specially drafted pages dealing primarily with the modifications. The agreement
provided that RTC would complete the project by a set date. The dispute arose
because the modifications were not completed on time. Pursuant to a provision
for arbitration in the agreement, the dispute was submitted to a single arbitra-
tor, whose award included consequential damages. RTC claimed consequential
damages were excluded by the contract and that the arbitrator thus exceeded his
authority.165
The court pointed out that an arbitrator's award was to be reversed only on
the ground of fraud, arbitrary conduct, or significant procedural irregularity.
An arbitrator may not award damages going beyond clearly marked limits of the
contract. The provision relied on by RTC to exclude consequential damages
was contained in the standard license form's canned warranty of title provisions.
The court believed the limitation could reasonably be construed as limited to
damages for this warranty. Even if construed more broadly, it could be inter-
preted to extend only to the licensing and not to the modifications. Since either
construction was reasonable and since the standard language was to be con-
strued against its author, the court sustained the arbitrator's damage award. 6 '
BANKRUPTCY
Last year's survey'67 commented on Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal
Finishers,'68 which involved the right of a bankruptcy trustee to reject a
technology licensing agreement. Congress has amended the Bankruptcy Code to
override this decision. The legislation provides that licensees of bankrupt
licensors may elect to retain their rights under executory contracts to intellectual
property. 16
165. 524 N.E.2d at 406.
166. Id. at 407.
167. Boss & Woodward, supra note 1, at 1551.
168. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
169. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 1, 102 Stat. 2538
(1988). See generally 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3200.
